Cost effective strategies in rehabilitation for affordable home ownership projects : an analysis of the LISC 1-4 family program for Codman Square Neighborhood Development Corporation by Wade, Terrence L. (Terrence Lee)
Cost Effective Strategies in Rehabilitation for Affordable Home Ownership Projects:
An Analysis of the LISC 1-4 Family Program For
Codman Square Neighborhood Development Corporation
by
Terrence L. Wade
A.B. Interdisciplinary Studies (Urban Theory)
University of California Berkeley, 1995
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER IN CITY PLANNING
AT THE
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
JUNE 1997
c 1997 Terrence L. Wade. All rights reserved.
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and
electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Xl A
Signature of Author:
Dep ent of Urban Studies and Planning
May 22, 1997
Certified by:
Langley C. Keyes
Ford Pr fessor of City egional Planning
visor
Accepted by:
J. Mark Schuster
ociate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
Chair, MCP Committee
JUN 2 5 1997 Roteg
Cost Effective Strategies in Rehabilitation for Affordable Home Ownership Projects:
An Analysis of the LISC 1-4 Family Program For
Codman Square Neighborhood Development Corporation
by
Terrence L. Wade
A.B. Interdisciplinary Studies (Urban Theory)
University of California Berkeley, 1995
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER IN CITY PLANNING
AT THE
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
JUNE 1997
Abstract
This thesis identifies strategies for Codman Square Neighborhood Development Corporation
to reduce costs in its administration of the 1-4 Family Program, a rehabilitation for affordable
home ownership program financed by the Local Initiatives Support Corporation, the Boston
Community Loan Fund, the City of Boston's Public Facilities Department, and the state's
Department of Housing and Community Development.
Using interviews and published research, this thesis provides a history of the 1-4 Family
Program, discusses the current work of Codman Square NDC, and analyzes costs of Codman
Square NDC's 1-4 Family projects according to those costs that can be controlled internally and
external costs incurred as a result of 1-4 Family Program requirements. Examples of private and
non-profit developers conducting rehabilitation outside of the 1-4 Family Program are also
analyzed.
Three strategies that Codman Square NDC can pursue to reduce costs in its administration of
the 1-4 Family Program are offered: (1) finding, hiring, and cultivating relationships with
low-bidding construction contractors, (2) convincing program funders to streamline the
program and reduce the number of its many constraints, and (3) reducing the scope of work
practiced from a gut to moderate level of rehabilitation.
Thesis Advisor: Langley C. Keyes
Title: Professor, Urban Studies and Planning
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Introduction
Codman Square Neighborhood Development Corporation, a Boston non-profit,
administers the 1-4 Family Housing Program. Funded by public and private entities, the program
rehabilitates property for sale to low-income home buyers. Because the costs of Codman Square
NDC developed properties have been high, and because high costs threaten the 1-4 Family
program's longevity, this thesis identifies strategies for the NDC to reduce its costs and to
increase housing production by analyzing (1) the NDC's own "cost structure" (2) the comparative
experience of other community development corporations administering the 1-4 Family program
(3) the practice of non-profit housing rehabilitation in other cities, and (4) rehabilitation as
practiced by local private developers working outside of the 1-4 Family Program.'
Chapter One provides a history of the 1-4 Family Program and its funding and
administrative structure. Chapter Two discusses the soft housing market problem in Codman
Square and the housing programs Codman Square Neighborhood Development Corporation uses
to stabilize the Codman Square housing market. Chapter Three provides analyses of the potential
impact of rehabilitation work on Codman Square's housing market.
Chapter Four discusses the development process under the 1-4 Family Program and
compares it to conventional development scenarios. Chapters Five and Six discuss costs
according to six categories: Chapter Five, "Costs Codman Can Control," analyzes cost categories
one through four, and Chapter Six, "Costs Codman Can't Directly Control," analyzes cost
categories five and six. Where opportunities exist, suggestions are made to reduce the costs of
While this thesis narrowly focuses on ways Codman Square NDC can reduce its cost and increase its volume
production under the 1-4 Family program, its findings should nonetheless prove useful to other CDCs using the
program and for LISC when considering altering elements of program design to make using the program easier for
CDCs.
each area. Strategies to increase volume production under the 1-4 Family Program are identified
in Chapter Five.
Chapter Seven, "Learning From Those Outside the 1-4 Family Program," analyzes the
work practiced by a local private developer specializing in gut rehabilitation, locating the source
of his low costs. The practice in the private development world of reducing the scope of work
from gut to moderate rehabilitation when acquisition costs rise is analyzed. I also analyze the
possibilities of reducing costs at Codman Square NDC (in ways other than those identified in
Chapters Five and Six) by conducting moderate instead of gut rehabilitation work, the risks of
such an approach, and ways to mitigate such risks.
Chapter Eight offers conclusions and recommendations for action at Codman Square
NDC.
Chapter One
History of the 1-4 Family Program
The 1-4 Family Program was implemented in November 1994 by the Boston office of the
Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) in cooperation with the Boston Community Loan
Fund (BCLF), the City of Boston Public Facilities Department (PFD), and local community
development corporations (CDCs). The idea of the 1-4 Family program began to form during
phase one of Boston LISC's National Community Development Initiative (NCDI) 2 when local
LISC staff recognized that their initial program strategy for Boston was less popular and less
feasible than originally anticipated.3
In the early 1990s, many Boston CDCs observed widespread foreclosures of residential
property in their neighborhoods. These foreclosoures destabilized neighborhoods by reducing
property values and leaving properties vacant and neglected. CDCs worried that much of this
vacant property would follow the course of vacant property in many inner-city areas, becoming
2 The National Community Development Initiative (NCDI), established in 1991 by eight national funders, provides
philanthropic resources to build the capacity of community development corporations nationwide. Since its
founding, the NCDI consortium has assembled $150 million dollars for community development efforts. Funds are
used for technical assistance, training, housing development, economic development, and social services. LISC is
one of two national community development intermdiaries (the other being the Enterprise Foundation) that carries
out NCDI's goals and funds distribution in 24 localities nationwide. Each locality has specific programs custom
designed for its needs and community development environment. NCDI is currently in its third phase of funding
commitments. NCDI's phase two was a three year period backed by six of the original funders and five new ones,
including public entities such as HUD. Executive summary, NCDI Phase III Proposal, LISC Boston 1996.
' Boston LISC's initial program under NDCI aimed to provide community development corporations with financial
and technical support in the development of single-room occupancy (SRO) housing. Some of the SRO housing
was to be developed for special populations such as AIDS patients and mentally ill individuals. At the same time,
the Public Facilities Department and the Boston Community Loan Fund were planning to work with non-CDC
nonprofit developers to develop SRO housing. LISC's efforts were to complement these other efforts. Of the
Public Facilities Department's goal of leading the development of 1000 rooms of SRO housing over four years as
part of its "Room For More Campaign", LISC intended to finance the production of 300 SRO rooms.
These goals, however, were never attained and the program was never fully implemented for three primary
reasons. First, public sector support was reduced as the local economy declined, lending institutions were reluctant
to lend long-term to SRO projects, and the constituents of CDCs did not favor the construction of SRO housing in
their neighborhoods. CDC leaders also believed that a SRO housing program would not serve their neighborhoods
as well as other programs might because the SRO program did not target the source of instability in such
neighborhoods.
the domain of illicit activity or falling into disrepair and ending up as vacant land. The high
number of foreclosures was caused by widespread speculation and rapid price escalation in inner-
city housing markets in the late 1980s. When the regional economy declined and the real estate
bubble burst in the early 1990s, investors were left with overvalued mortgages and defaulted on
loans to limit financial loss.
Once Boston LISC staff recognized the need for a new program strategy under NCDI in
mid-1992, LISC worked with community development corporations to design a program targeted
to meet the needs of Boston area neighborhoods. The result of these efforts was the creation of
the 1-4 Family program. The 1-4 Family program was to rehabilitate distressed properties of one-
to-four units held by banks and public agencies for sale to low-income home buyers. Home
owners were to act as landlords of the remaining units. The program aimed to rehabilitate 60-70
properties totaling 130-160 units over a three year period. In addition to its own NCDI money,
LISC gained funding commitments from the Boston Community Loan Fund, the Public Facilities
Department, and the state's Executive Office of Communities and Development. The program
was initially approved by all involved parties in June of 1993.4
To become a participating community development corporation (CDC) in the 1-4 Family
program, the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) and the Boston Community Loan
Fund (BCLF) required CDCs to fill out lengthy pre-enrollment packets demonstrating a CDCs
development history, strategic planning, program goals, plans for marketing and project
management. Eleven CDCs were accepted into the program, eight in Boston and one each in
Cambridge, Somerville, and Waltham.
4 ibid., page 11.
Statement on Program Funds, Term, and Administrative Structure
The Boston area 1-4 Family Program is a rehabilitation for affordable housing program
funded by the Boston Community Loan Fund (BCLF), the Local Initiatives Support Corporation
(LISC), and depending on the city in which a CDC operates, public agencies administering
subsidies. In Boston, the Public Facilities Department (PFD) gives CDCs half of their 1-4 Family
project gap subsidies, the remainder comes from the State's Department of Housing and
Community Development. In Cambridge, Somerville, and Waltham, CDCs receive all of their gap
subsidies from the state's Department of Housing and Community Development. The gap subsidy
covers the difference between total development cost and the sales price of a 1-4 Family project.
The 3.5 year program ends December 1997. Funding commitments and sources are complicated.
LISC and BCLF equally provide construction financing on 90% of the projected sale price of a
rehabilitated house, and bridge finance 90% of the total development cost. LISC and BCLF have
each committed $2.4 million with each CDC receiving a single line of credit of $600,000. In a
HOME fund entitlement city like Boston, PFD finances half of the public subsidy for a 1-4 project
directly from the federal government, while the state agency Department of Housing and
Community Development (DHCD, formerly EOCD) matches the other half with its own federal
HOME funds. In non-entitlement cities such as Cambridge, CDCs receive all of their public
subsidy from DHCD. Combined, PFD and DHCD have allocated $7 million to the program, with
each CDC receiving the opportunity to use up to $875,000 of subsidy over the life of the project.
A participating community development corporation (CDC), acting as the developer, provides an
equity contribution of roughly 10% of the projected sale price. Depending on its size, a typical
three family triple-decker house rehabilitated under the 1-4 family program will have a sale price
of $100,000-125,000 and a total development cost of $260,000-290,000.
To date, the 1-4 Family Program has produced 114 units of housing, falling somewhat
short of its 160 unit goal. Though the program is effective (it has saved troubled properties,
helped to stabilize neighborhoods, and provided affordable home ownership opportunities to
income qualified first-time home buyers) program participants and others maintain that program
costs are too high. The high costs frustrate subsidy providers, lenders, and developers.
Continued high costs threaten the program's ability to rely on public subsidies over the long term
as $50,000 ($150,000 per building) or more of subsidy per rehabilitated unit are difficult to justify
to funding bodies.5
Chapter Two
Rehabilitation as a Neighborhood Strategy in Codman Square:
Community Opportunities and Market Dilemmas
Since the late 1940s, rehabilitation has been used as a community development tool to
counter the negative effects of disinvestment, outmigration, and other "urban problems" which
many urban neighborhoods, including Boston, suffered in the post-world war two era. Within the
Boston region neighborhoods were negatively effected by economic restructuring and the
decrease of blue-collar jobs. In places such as Dorchester, Roxbury, and East Boston, poorer
populations-with less access to good jobs and unable to pay high housing rents, offer low-rent
rates to landlords. Often this leads to deferred maintenance or neglect on the part of landlords.
5 1-4 Family Program: Statement of Additional Agreements among PFD, LISC, and BCLF, November 22,1994.
Landlords forego maintenance when rental rates fall. As a result the housing stock suffers. Once
created, inner city housing markets become "soft" and behave in peculiar ways.
The falling wages and living standards of owner-occupants also contribute to housing
stock decline and soft market creation. Falling household incomes cause homeowners, who were
at one time able to pay for upkeep of their homes, to forego maintenance--sometime for years.
On a widespread scale, many homeowners foregoing maintenance cause the housing stock quality
to decline and sale prices to fall. In the end, homeowners lose substantial portions of their
"equity" in their homes as the value of their largest asset declines. This limits their ability to
obtain home-equity loans large enough to do necessary rehabilitation work. This first dilemma,
the loss of equity for existing home owners in soft markets, must be confronted by any community
development strategy attempting to reverse neighborhood decline.
An overall poor quality housing stock inhibits investment on the part of first-time home
buyers, diminishing the value of the neighborhood as a whole, and reducing the quality of
commercial services. In the absence of first-time home buyer market entry, a long-term trend of
disinvestment on the part of homeowners, and falling real estate values, a devalued housing
market often creates other problems. Once devalued, urban neighborhoods are susceptible to
such practices as second-mortgage scams on the part of fly-by-night contractors, low-income
homeowners carrying too much debt on overvalued properties, and speculative investment on the
part of quick-flip investors during periods of economic expansion. In short, soft markets become
the domain of speculators. Thus, the second dilemma is the lack of home owner entry into the
market area and the resulting issue of a high percentage of speculative investment in the area.
These issues are responded to be creating programs that encourage existing owners to invest and
first time home buyers to enter the soft market area.
Codman Square exhibits these problems typical of soft housing markets: the loss of home
value to existing home owners, the lack of new home owner entry into the market, and
speculative activity on the part of investors. The "loss of value" phenomenon exists among
owner-occupied structures in Codman Square NDC's target area. Here, home ownership rates
are a high 35% and much of these owner-occupied houses are distressed. Practices typical of
speculative investment which effected Codman Square in the most recent real estate boom of the
early 1990s were "(1) recording inflated sales prices to create the illusion of a downpayment (2)
hidden second mortgages covering downpayment and closing costs (3) land flips to increase
recorded value and (4) mortgages in excess of sales price unrelated to construction." Though the
causes are complex, Ada Focer, a former deputy commissioner of banking for the Commonwealth
and a former Cowman Square NDC board member, cites the ill-designed incentives of different
members of the real estate profession for the speculative, boom-bust behavior of housing markets
in low-income neighborhoods-appraisers, mortgage originators, and investors. In such markets,
first-time home buyers, often desperate to buy homes, end up carrying too much debt. Each of
these problems leads to a process of speculation, housing foreclosure, abandonment, decline, and
often to vacant lots.6
Though the negative effects of speculation were widespread throughout Boston
neighborhoods in the early 1990s, their manifestation in Codman Square was the worst. As of
6 Quotes are from John Anderson, Ada Focer, and Franklin Tucker, "Bankrupting Families; Bankrupting
Neighborhoods: The Case Against Fleet," page 4, working paper 1996. In her 1994 MIT thesis "One-To-Four-
Family Home Foreclosures in South Dorchester," Sara Barcan analyzes the impact of mortgage origination
practices and the structure of the secondary mortgage market on foreclosure patterns in Codman Square.
August 1994, there had been 632 foreclosures in the Codman Square area (the most of any
neighborhood in the city) since 1988. East Boston experienced 471 foreclosures and Jamaica
Plain experienced 327. These numbers are strikingly different from Roslindale, where just 20
foreclosures occurred and where owner-occupancy rates and household incomes are higher. The
mortgages of most of the foreclosed property were originated during Boston's economic and real
estate boom of the mid-and late-1980s. 7
In response to the two dilemmas of a loss of value to home owners and a lack of home
owner entry into the market area, Codman Square administers two programs funded by two
different intermediaries. These two programs are the core physical development components of
Codman Square NDC's neighborhood stabilization strategy. The first of the two programs is
Neighborhood Housing Services, funded by the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation and the
second is the 1-4 Family Program. Both programs focus on increasing the percentage of home
owners in the neighborhood and protecting investment of home owners, as home owners are
believed to be committed to the neighborhood over the long-term.
Current Boston Rehabilitation Programs Used By Codman Square NDC
Currently, two main housing market issues confront low-income neighborhoods in
Boston, particularly Codman Square. (1) The lack of affordable and quality home ownership and
rental opportunities for low and moderate income families. (2) A large amount of foreclosed
upon property owned by banks or other intermediaries, abandoned housing, physically distressed
properties, and vacant land. Vacant land and abandoned property decrease the number of rentable
7 Matt Carroll, "Stopping the Flood of Foreclosures," Boston Globe, August 24, 1994.
housing units in neighborhoods and, perhaps more significantly, reduce the likelihood that people
will invest in these neighborhoods. The negative externalities produced by distressed housing on
a given street decrease the likelihood of private investors buying adjacent properties on that
street. The 1-4 Family program is a programmatic response at the neighborhood level which
responds to recent housing market issues in Boston, particularly neighborhoods like Codman
Square NDC.
The 1-4 Family Program was designed, in cooperation with CDCs, to stabilize
neighborhoods by specifically targeting properties most susceptible to foreclosures-
condominiums, and 2-3 family unit buildings which tend to be bought by speculators. Thus, the
1-4 Family Program is an excellent program for Codman Square. Its are: t,
to stabilize neighborhoods by removing properties from the speculaThvenTarketpace to increase
the number of homeowners in a given housing market. Home owners are believed to bring
stability and long-term commitment/investments to distressed neighborhood's. Second, to extend
affordable home ownership opportunities to low and moderate income families. Third, timulate
reinvestment in the neighborhood as rehabilitating severely distressed properties will serve as a
catalyst for subsequent private investment.8 These second and third goals, as I argue in Chapter
Eight, are one source of the significant differences between rehabilitation costs for private and
CDC developers. A high level of finish is required to ensure that low-income homeowners do not
have to incur high maintenance costs in the future--a factor that would increase loan default rates
and destabilize neighborhood housing markets.
8 LISC-NCDI pages 2,21.
The other rehabilitation program Codman Square administers is Neighborhood Housing
Services. Neighborhood Housing Services, the other major Boston area rehabilitation program,
provides low interest rehabilitation loans to existing homeowners. Administered by a consortium
of CDCs, many of which are also active in the 1-4 Family Program, the program aims to maintain
and improve the quality of the housing stock in marginal neighborhoods, keep existing
homeowners in their homes, and protect the investments of homeowners. Unlike the 1-4 Family
Program, the Neighborhood Housing Services program does not provide funding for major
rehabilitation and does not aim to extend new home ownership opportunities to families. The
Neighborhood Housing Services protects and improves housing units and the investments of
moderate income households while the 1-4 Family Program creates new housing and ownership
opportunities where currently there are not any.
While CDCs and cities have historically been active in the rehabilitation of multifamily
rental housing to address abandonment issues, there have been fewer programs administered by
CDCs that rehabilitate small properties for sale to low-income home buyers. The 1-4 Family
Program is unique primarily because it funds rehabilitation for affordable home ownership and the
renovation of small properties on a wide scale. Most 1-4 Family projects are substantial (gut)
rehabilitations. Though the 1-4 Family program was organized by LISC/BCLF as a local initiative
and depends on public funds for gap financing, construction financing for the program (or
community development in general) would exist in the absence of public subsidy as LISC and
BCLF are private entities. A program of its kind has never been tried widely on the federal scale
and it is a unique program for LISC.
Chapter Three
The potential market impact of fixing the worst housing in Codman Square
Beyond the soft market problem and its manifestations in Codman Square, if rehabilitation
is a stabilizing community development tool, how will it effect Codman Square? The success of
the rehabilitation programs in Codman Square should drive up prices of other homes, improve the
health of the neighborhood, but also decrease the affordability of units.
Depending on neighborhood contexts, rehabilitation programs can be "stabilizing" or
"preventative" in orientation. Codman Square's efforts are stabilizing in orientation. Market
price reflects three things principally-location, unit size, and the condition of the property. In
this equation, location and unit size are more heavily reflected in market price than the condition
of the unit. Unit condition does not have an equal effect on price in soft markets. In Codman
Square, a rehabilitated property with a total development cost of 300,000 will only sell for
$125,000-$130,000 maximum. This is the maximum price the Codman Square maretranhear..
Thus, because of the peculiar nature of rehabilitation (or real estate markets in general) the
construction costs of fully renovated properties in Codman Square are not accurately reflected in
their purchase price.
At the same time, adjacent properties capture some of the value of the rehabilitation
project in the form of positive externalities. Rehabilitated properties will drive up prices of
surrounding buildings, making it more difficult for other families to enter the housing market.
Substantially rehabilitated properties should tend to increase the price of adjacent stock in poorer
condition. One of the variables appraisers account for is the recent sale prices of adjacent
properties. Rehabilitated 1-4 Family properties sell at the top of Codman Square's market.
Because this is so, it suggests that the 1-4 Family Program might create a condition which
encourages speculative turnover or which raises prices of distressed property surrounding
rehabilitation projects.
With the 1-4 Family Program, Codman Square NDC tends to work with the most troubled
properties in its target area with the theory that no private investor will confrontphygilyedy
properties and, once completed, the projects will serve as catalysts for subsequent private
investment in the neighborhood. These efforts are viewed as a way to stabilize a highly
dysfunctional housing market and create affordable housing. In neighborhoods other than
Codman Square that are gentrifying and where housing prices are escalating, the 1-4 Family
Programs is viewed as a way of attaching affordability covenants to rehabilitated units,
maintaining a supply of affordable housing in the neighborhood, and removing vacant distressed
properties from neighborhoods.
Market Impact of the Market Itself
Beyond the impacts that the 1-4 Family and NHS rehabilitation programs might have on
prices in Codman Square, changes in regional/national economic forces could potentially cause
acquisition costs in Codman Square to rise. As a result, rising acquisition costs will constrain 1-4
Family rehabilitation production as a smaller number of projects consume the existing amount of
available public funds allocated to Codman Square. Whether the goals of a given rehabilitation
program are to reestablish dysfunctional markets, create affordable units in a gentrifying area, or
both, acquisition costs will rise. Presumably, some distressed properties that would not be
privately rehabilitated in a recessionary economic period would be rehabilitated in a period of
economic expansion. The need for rehabilitation might decline in an expansionary economy,
while the need for affordable housing might increase--particularly if cost of living inflate at a faster
rate than the incomes of lower income households. Thus, over time, the orientation of Codman
Square's administration of the 1-4 Family program might shift from "stabilizing" and inner-city
area to "preventing" gentrification.
Affordable housing and quality housing: are they incompatible?
What does the eradication (rehabilitation) of the worst housing in Codman Square and the
creation of affordable housing mean? Sub-standard housing is often affordable precisely because
of its sub-standard character. This suggests that some incompatibility exists between the
eradication of the worst housing in the neighborhood and the continued affordability of that
housing. Quality housing is (barring any publicly managed program) not affordable to
disadvantaged members of society. If the rehabilitated housing which eradicates the worst
housing is to be kept as quality affordable housing this therefore implies an on-going
institutionalized relationship between the state and a given unit of affordable housing. These
institutionalized relationships administer subsidy. Institutionalized relationships occur within
federal, state, or city agencies, or increasingly with public and private intermediaries.
In programs that rehabilitate property for affordable rental housing, subsidies can exist for
owners, renters, or property managers. They can cover maintenance, rent, debt service, or normal
profits. The relationships necessitated by administering subsidy are often ongoing and indefinite.
When terms of life for a program are not indefinite, bailouts and dispositions for expiring use
projects necessitate the creation of new subsidy administering bodies or requiring existing bodies
to acquire new units to manage. In Boston, for example, the Metropolitan Boston Housing
Partnership has acquired and restructured the financing of expiring-use affordable housing
projects in recent years.
Affordable home ownership programs, whether rehabilitation, new construction of single
family homes, or mutual housing in multifamily units, take many different legal and physical
forms. The current political environment which favors affordable home ownership programs is
principally advocated for because such programs, in theory, abdicate the state of continued
responsibility for managing and maintaining affordable housing; subsidies provided by the state
for affordable home ownership programs are often one-time grants. Or if the state remains
involved through partially subsidizing debt on a property, home ownership programs are expected
to be less costly than other housing programs because management and maintenance costs are
borne by home owners. The 1-4 Family Program, for example, shifts property management
functions of two rental units from a public or non-profit agency to a low-income home owner.'
However, the premises of these programs may be flawed. Ten to fifteen years into the life
of a rehabilitation for home ownership project, maintenance needs will be significant as life
expectancies of house components expire. Given that incomes of poor households grow more
slowly than rates of housing and construction costs, it is not necessarily true that a limited income
home owner would have the income to perform necessary maintenance on his or her home. At
9 For discussions of recent types of affordable home ownership programs see John Buckley, "From Dream to
Reality," Mortgage Banking, September 1995. Jess Lederman, "Pioneering New Affordable Strategies," Mortgage
Banking, September 1995. Gordon Steinbach, "A Reasoned Approach to Affordable Housing," Mortgage
Banking, September 1993. Ravi Yalamanchi, "The Lansing Plan: An Affordable Housing Approach," Journal of
Housing, May 1993. For a critique of home ownership programs as conservative ideology, see Jim Kemeny "A
Critique of Homeownership," in Rachel Bratt et. al. Critical Perspectives on Housing, Temple University Press,
Philadelphia 1986. For a discussion on home ownership for the poor, see Seth Borgos "Low-Income
Homeownership and the ACORN Squatters Campaign" in Critical Perspectives on Housing.
the same time, it is not necessarily true that he/she could service the debt on home-equity loans
used to do maintenance. As such, and contrary to the prevailing wisdom regarding affordable
home ownership programs, a continued or new relationship might be required between the state
and the homeowner in order to perform necessary maintenance in the future. Not doing
maintenance and allowing affordable units to decline, or owners to carry too much debt and
default, might create a destabilizing influence in neighborhood housing markets.
While there exists a substantial history of programs that offer public funds for affordable
home ownership, for the rehabilitation of property for rental housing, and rehabilitation loans to
existing home owners, fewer programs have existed that rehabilitate vacant property for
affordable home ownership. Thus, the 1-4 Family Program is a somewhat atypical program. 0
Evaluations and analyses of rehabilitation programs have looked at economic feasibility, economic
desirability, issues of relocation caused by rehabilitating large apartment units, and issues of
gentrification (urban homesteading programs in particular). The principal debates within housing
10 Housing rehabilitation has taken a variety of forms in the United States. From "gray area urban renewal" in the
1950s, to locally administered and federally funded code enforcement programs in the 1960s and 70s,
rehabilitation has surfaced as a community development tool in a number of capacities--from flexible grants to
specifically earmarked programs. Though a few cities had looked at code enforcement and rehabilitation issues as
early as the 1940s, federal money did not make rehabilitation programmatic until the Housing Act of 1954 which
insured second mortgages for lenders offering rehabilitation financing. These provisions did not make large dents
in the percentage of subsidized housing units which were rehabilitated. Through the 1960s, HUD earmarked
increased funds for rehabilitation-- for large buildings with many subsidized units, for cities needing code
enforcement funds and, to a lesser extent, families trying to buy rehabilitated properties. Since the 1970s, most
rehabilitation has occurred through the use of flexible federal grants-in-aid such as CDBG money and, more
recently, HOME money. Rehabilitation spending between cities is uneven as it occurs in the larger context of
comprehensive community development programs designed by local agencies and groups to respond to the
particular problems of neighborhoods and cities. Subsidized rehabilitated units as a percent of total subsidized
housing production per year has fluctuated from seven to twenty percent between the years 1961-1983, with peaks
in the late 1960s and the early 1980s. Data for more recent years is not available because HUD does not track
CDBG financed rehabilitated units.10 Since the tax reform act of 1986 when it was created, the Low Income
Housing Tax Credit has been the primary source of equity financing for affordable housing projects nationwide.
For further particulars, see Paul Dommel, et. al. "Housing Rehabilitation" and John Heinberg "The Evolution of
Rehabilitation As Public Policy," in David Listokin ed. Housing Rehabilitation: Economic, Social, and Policy
Perspectives, (Rutgers 1993).
rehabilitation programs remain: (1) is rehabilitation cheaper than new construction? what are the
respective life terms of each housing unit? and (2) should rehabilitation efforts be targeted or done
in a scatter-site manner? Despite a multitude of studies on these two questions, results and the
implied assumptions of existing programs are mixed.
Chapter Four: The Development Process: Operating Under the 1-4 Family Program,
With Comparisons to Conventional Rehabilitation Scenarios
Once accepted into the 1-4 Family Program, Codman Square NDC wanted to conduct
two, three, or four rehabilitation projects at once, though LISC/BCLF standards required that
each CDC demonstrate success with one project before tackling a handful. The rationale for this
requirement was that although CDCs had experience with large rental projects, none had
experience with small purchase-rehabilitation projects. Compared to a private developer, the
development process for Codman and for all CDCs using the 1-4 Family Program is much
longer-principally because of externally imposed requirements of the program and acquisition
problems.
The development process for CDCs such as Codman Square participating in the 1-4
Family Program is lengthy and complex. In this chapter, I discuss the development process as it is
required by the 1-4 Family Program I conclude by comparing the development process of the 1-4
Family purchase rehabilitation program to the conventional development process for private
developers.
To access its line of credit as participating CDC in the 1-4 Family Program, Codman
Square must "enroll" its newly acquired property with LISC, BCLF, and PFD. Codman Square
begins the 1-4 Family development process by acquiring properties using either their its capital
reserves or acquisition loans from LISC or CEDAG. The first step after acquisition is to hire an
architect or rehabilitation specialist and to have the project pass PFD's design review. Next,
Codman Square NDC sends out bid packages to contractors and create budgets and pro formas
for their properties. At this point, Codman Square can enroll its properties in the program.
To enroll a property in the 1-4 Family Program, CDCs are responsible for five different
documents. In itself this is not onerous. But problems occur because CDCs rely on other
organizations to have these documents pass review in a timely manner. According to interviewed
1-4 Family project managers, enrollment problems do not occur with LISC/BCLF but do occur
with PFD. For example, to protect LISC/BCLF bridge money, CDCs are required to get PFD's
commitment to subsidize a particular property. This often takes one to two weeks for PFD to
approve and relies on a matching subsidy from EOCD. The complexity of the 1-4 Program (its
sources of funds and legal arrangements between non-profits, intermediaries, and public agencies)
causes the enrollment process to be lengthy. Signatures from each funding body are required for
project plans, construction specifications, and budgets. After enrollment, Codman Square NDC
begins construction on 1-4 properties.
The requisition process for 1-4 Family properties is complex and time consuming.
Theoretically, draw downs on Codman's line-of-credit are supposed to occur monthly. But the
frequency of these requisitions are subject to the discretion of the contractor and her/his ability to
forego payment for a given period of time. For these small purchase-rehabilitation projects, draw
downs involve considerable oversight. After Codman receives draw down requests from their
contractors, Codman sends all requisition paperwork to the Public Facilities Department, even
though PFD money does not enter into the development process until the project is nearly
completed. PFD works with LISC and BCLF to obtain signatures and approval from each
funding body. At each requisition, a construction monitor employed by LISC/BCLF and another
by PFD must visit the site to verify construction work progress. So too must Codman's
architect/rehabilitation specialist. At each requisition, a title run must occur to certify that
contractor's have not placed any mechanics liens on the property. Each title certificate costs
$200. These requisition processes consume the labor time of all involved, lengthen the
construction process and thereby drive up the project cost by increasing the amount of interest
paid on construction financing.
Once the stage of substantial completion is reached, Codman begins the closing process.
Substantial completion is defined as the point at which the project is completed but the certificate
of occupancy has not been filed with the city. LISC and BCLF finance, in the form of a bridge
loan, up to 90% of a 1-4 Family project's substantial completion amount. At the point of
substantial completion and the final requisition, Codman asks the three funding bodies for
remaining payments to be made to the contractor and asks PFD to begin paying back LISC and
BCLF for their bridge loan. Assuming the final requisition occurs and the bridge loan is closed
upon, PFD's gap financing (the difference between the total development cost and the projected
sales price) is paid to LISC and BCLF. The remainder of the LISC/BCLF construction financing
remains outstanding until Codman sells its houses. Though project managers at interviewed
CDCs interviewed commend the professionalism and promptness of LISC and BCLF in the
closing process, conplaints were made about the untimeliness of the Public Facilities Department
in closing on their gap financing commitments. Costs incurred by Codman Square and other
CDCs in the closing process is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five, but for now suffice it to
say that PFD's lengthy closings increase project timelines and costs.
From beginning to end, an entire 1-4 Family project can take one year. According to
Marty Chapman, a former general contractor and now a program manager at Codman Square
NDC, this process would take a private developer just six weeks. Figure 1 compares the
differences in the development process for a private developer and community development
corporation utilizing the 1-4 Family program.
Compared to a private developer, Codman takes much more time to get the construction
phase of the development process because of the complexities of acquiring distressed properties
and enrolling a property in the 1-4 family program. Compared to a conventional rehabilitation
scenario, the timeline for a CDC 1-4 family rehabilitation project is also lengthy. In a private
rehabilitation scenario, a contractor submits a requisition to the project architect, the architect
certifies that the work is complete for the owner, and the owner draws on her/his line of credit
with a bank. This procedure is relatively seamless and can occur in just a few days. Why? There
is very little oversight on the part of the lender as the bank relies on its faith in the developer's
reputation to manage the construction process and ensure work is being completed satisfactorily.
That is, in the conventional development market where developers often use the same
construction lender for years at a time, a high level of trust builds and mitigates the need for
oversight.
Chapter Five: Costs Codman Square NDC Can Control
With the earlier discussion of program design and the development process under the 1-4
Family program in mind, chapters five and six analyze project cost factors according to five
categories. These are costs due to (1) acquisition (2) construction, contracting, and bidding (3)
soft costs (4) costs of internal staffing and work organization at the CDC, (5) the externally
imposed requirements of the program, and (6) those related to the fee structure of the program.
Cost categories one through four are discussed in Chapter Five, and categories five and six are
discussed in Chapter Six, "Costs That Codman Can't Control: Program Requirements That
Constrain All CDCs Using the 1-4 Family Program." In so doing, I identify potential cost-cutting
solutions, about which recommendations are made in Chapter Nine.
The Acquisition Problem, Its Effect on Production, and Acquisition Costs
Codman Square has struggled to acquire properties; some CDCs have done better. This
struggle slows down the 1-4 Family program's progress by lowering Codman Square NDC
production levels. Most importantly, opportunities for cost-cutting that exist by taking advantage
of economies of scale accruing from volume production will not work unless Codman Square
owns multiple properties. All cost reduction strategies rely on a successful acquisition strategy.
Acquisition is one aspect of the program that Codman Square does have control over; assuming
capital for acquisition is available, Codman Square can make efforts to build an effective
acquisition strategy. Though Codman Square NDC has recently acquired three properties, over a
three year period just five properties have been acquired. Acquiring properties is difficult because
Codman Square is less active in conventional property sales networks than private realty groups
and because government systems that dispose of distressed property are lengthy, especially when
they involve tax foreclosures.
Compared to private developers, Codman Square NDC does not have well-developed
contacts with brokers. Many of the distressed properties that Codman wants to acquire are not
held by intermediaries. For example, nearly half of the properties that Codman Square NDC
would potentially like to acquire in area 6 of the service area are owned by the city. Acquiring
each property from the city is a lengthy process. But, acquisition costs for city owned properties
offer the potential of cheaper costs than those owned by intermediaries as city owned properties
can often be acquired for the amount of back taxes owed. Ignoring site-specific considerations,
Codman has an incentive to get cheaper properties from the city. Doing so lowers its TDC and
means Codman has to put out less money on the front end of a deal before getting it back at
project completion.
Intermediaries list their foreclosed properties through brokers. Before advertising their
properties, brokers will call all of the private developers they know who might be interested in the
property. Codman Square does not have "tight" relationships with brokers the way private
investors do. Though Codman Square NDC has purchased a property from Fannie Mae, Fannie
Mae usually lists its properties through brokers as well. Codman Square NDC has the
opportunity, given contacts at Fannie Mae, to attempt to negotiate a package deal of property
acquisition with them--of properties they currently hold or properties they might acquire via
foreclosures in the future. In all three instances, whether properties are gained from brokers, the
city, or intermediaries directly, the strategy of group acquisition could substantially boost
production levels, create significant neighborhood impact, and reduce per unit costs, especially if
Codman opts to use a construction management approach that relies on volume production to
take advantage of economies of scale in materials purchasing and fees. Such an approach,
however, would add another layer of professional service to a program that is already overstaffed.
In fact, costs might increase by adding another piece of professional expertise to the process and
because labor costs and legal costs remain relatively constant regardless of scale."
When Codman wants to buy a property not listed with brokers or owned by the city, it
must track down absentee owners, do property research, and hope to convince the owner to sell.
This fourth type of property acquisition, tracking down individual owners, is likely too costly
from an internal staffing perspective. However, periodic mailings and purchase offers to owners
addresses might be a worthwhile and non-time intensive effort. Check number of privately owned
distressed properties.
A volume acquisition of three or more properties would create a higher volume of
production and a more predictable operating environment by allowing Codman Square NDC to
maximize the use of its line of credit at a given point in time and to plan beyond the hypothetical
maximum line of credit use. Currently, as a CDC participating in the program, Codman can
access a $600,000 line of credit with LISC/BCLF. If construction costs were low enough
($200,000 per project), CDCs could develop three properties simultaneously and produce more
significant neighborhood impacts.
Acquisition costs have been rising during the last three years of economic growth,
recovering from the early 1990s recession. As a result, acquisition costs Codman Square are
playing an increasingly important role in 1-4 Family project costs and consuming a larger
" Some of these comments are based on information from Residential/Commercial Inspection Service, a local
company that provided a construction management prospectus to Codman Square NDC in April 1997.
percentage of total development costs. However, other neighborhoods have experienced greater
price escalation recently. Even if CDCs lower construction costs further by finding lower bidders
such as Charles Joseph, which seems unlikely except in the case of Codman Square NDC, rising
acquisition costs will constrain volume production for CDCs, though Codman may fair less badly
than other CDCs.
For example, the Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Development Corporation (JPNDC) is
currently bidding on a property for $50,000 and lost another property to a private developer for
$70,000. While construction costs have stayed relatively constant during NOAH's12 experience
with the program, acquisition costs have increased by 500% between 309 Saratoga rehabilitated
in 1993 and the 53 Havre Street rehabilitated in 1997. These rising costs are due partly to
NOAH's successful neighborhood stabilization program, though larger regional economic forces
are also responsible for these price increases. On some streets, NOAH has rehabilitated the one
or two eyesores on the street, undoubtedly raising the assessed value of surrounding properties.
Acquisition costs for NOAH's 53 Havre Street, purchased from a private owner, were $70,000.
Codman Square NDC's acquisition costs for 47 Aspinwall Road, bought from the city, were 90%
less, or $7,000.
Acquisition costs in Codman Square have been much lower because, when compared to
Jamaica Plain, gentrification pressures are nearly non-existent and there are many more vacant or
abandoned properties in Codman Square. Codman Square also bought its first two properties
through the city and Fannie Mae when the real estate prices in Dorchester were still low.
Acquisition costs for Codman Square NDC's first two projects were $7,000 and 2,000. But
" The Neighborhood of Affordable Housing is an East Boston CDC.
prices acquisition costs are projected to increase. Expected acquisition costs for 24 Athelwold,
82 Wheatland, and 3 Herbert are $26,000, $29,000, and $55,000 respectively. 17 Kenberma has
$23,000 in acquisition costs primarily because of back taxes and water and sewer costs, though its
sale price is zero. The "price" for 17 Kenberma is itself a result of the early 1990s housing market
crash in Dorchester and symptomatic of the financial and physical distress of many properties in
Codman Square. (Interestingly, this distress, in the form of back taxes at 17 Kenberma Road, is
being paid for by public subsidies). Regardless, these acquisition costs are two to three hundred
percent higher than the acquisition prices of Codman Square NDC's first two rehabilitation
projects. Uneven price escalation across neighborhoods raises questions about how a program
structure that treats neighborhoods in a "universal" will respond. Can these rising acquisition
costs be avoided, is there a best practice scenario and the opportunity to couple them with the
lowered construction costs? I answer this question later.
Construction, Contracting, and Bidding
Given that overall project costs are high in the 1-4 Family program and lenders, subsidy
providers, and Codman staff agree that costs need to be reduced, can high construction costs be
reduced? This section compares the costs of Codman Square NDC 1-4 Family projects to those
of the Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Development Corporation (JPNDC) and the Neighborhood of
Affordable Housing (NOAH) in East Boston. Also discussed are the nature of contracting and
bidding as practiced at Codman Square and other CDCs. Potentials for cost-reduction
approaches directly related to the construction component of the cost equation are identified in
Chapter Nine.
Here, I discuss costs of ten 1-4 Family projects done by three CDCs-- Jamaica Plain
Neighborhood Development Corporation, the Neighborhood of Affordable Housing in East
Boston, and Codman Square NDC. Though Figure 2 shows square footage and project costs
according to different variables, the primary unit of analysis is costs per square foot. Codman
Square NDC has completed and sold one property and is currently completing another. NOAH
has sold six houses and is currently at work on five 1-4 family properties in its East Boston
service area. JPNDC has done four projects, Codman expects to do four in the coming six
months. The average cost for construction administrations and architectural services of the ten
properties analyzed is $8,000. Average acquisition costs of the projects is $20,000. Construction
costs, which comprise 60% of the project costs average $166,000. The average unit cost is
$102,000. Total development costs average $248,000. Other fees and costs constitute an
average of $55,000 per project and the average sales price is $118,460. This means that, of the
ten projects examined here, the average subsidy per project is $130,000. Most importantly, the
average total development costs per square foot is $99.
At first glance Codman's costs appear more expensive than other CDCs. Total
development costs for 47 Aspinwall were $287,516; total development cost for NOAH's 53
Havre Street are $239,768. While this $48,000 difference in construction cost is substantial, the
per square foot cost for Codman Square NDC's 47 Aspinwall were $67 per square feet while
NOAH's 53 Havre Street cost was a substantially larger $97 per square foot. In this case,
NOAH's total development costs are cheaper in general because their projects are nearly one half
the size of those done by Codman Square NDC. As a corollary, NOAH's per square foot costs
are high because small houses mean that expensive plumbing and heating systems and walls make
up a larger portion of the cost structure than the large projects of Codman Square NDC. For
example, 55 Aspinwall in the Codman Square area measures 3354 square feet while 309 Saratoga
in East Boston measures 1656 square feet. Thus, the dominant house type and lot size in Codman
Square and East Boston create different cost outcomes and constrain each CDCs ability to lower
costs--particularly for NOAH.
Codman Square's dominant house type is more consistent than the diverse housing types
and lot sizes of JPNDC's service area. This fact makes tracking consistency of cost changes over
time difficult as JPNDC has rehabilitated very different houses in different states of repair. For
example, JPNDC's per unit costs range from as low as $59,000 on 85 Chestnut Street (a house
not needing gut rehabilitation) to $144,000 per unit on 61 Walden Street (a home that needed
structural work). Other JPNDC projects such as 108 Milden Street, with per unit costs of
$98,000, are more similar to the average costs of Codman Square NDC and NOAH--costs in the
low to high $90,000 range. As a result, per square foot construction costs have fluctuated
significantly at JPNDC. 85 Chestnut Street cost $57 per square foot, 61 Walden cost $78 per
square foot. 73 Walden cost $105 per square foot, and 108 Minden cost $98 per square foot.
Codman has been able to avoid cost escalation due to modifying the design of small
structures--unlike JPNDC and NOAH which face tougher design problems. The need for design
modifications of small structures creates another factor of cost escalation for CDCs-particularly
NOAH and to a lesser extent JPNDC. Because of the small lot and unit size in East Boston,
NOAH has rehabilitated all of its 1-4 Family projects by converting three-family houses to two-
family houses. JPNDC has done similar work on 61 Walden and 73 Walden. NOAH and JPNDC
make these design modifications to increase the marketability of units. In east Boston, some
triple-Decker houses were once little more than three studio apartments stacked on top of one
another. Although there are no specific unit size requirements in the 1-4 Family Program, the pre-
rehabilitated unit sizes are smaller than minimum unit sizes required by funders such as
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency. Nonetheless, the design review team at PFD advocates
for particular design changes. But, it is most likely that the design outcome on a particular
property would be the same if PFD's design approval process were eliminated. After all, Codman
Square NDC hires trained architects to do the redesigning and the simple design and small units of
triple deckers can only lead to particular design outcomes.
Though rehabilitating a three-family unit as a two-family unit increases the development
cost per unit, it increases the marketability of the units. More interesting is that once these
conversions are made, not only does marketability increase, but the sale price increases. That is,
you can reduce your gap subsidy need by renovating a three-family as a two-family. This violates
traditional pricing models of income properties which find market price by dividing gross rents by
the capitalization rate. At the same time, affordability levels for home buyers should be reduced
as the amount of rental income which can be used in a mortgage lenders debt coverage ratio
declines. This reduction in affordability, however, is small and has not been a problem for NOAH
or JPNDC. Home buyers are only required to pay just $55 per month of their own income to
service mortgages under a buyer affordability analysis done by Codman Square NDC for a
property selling at $120,000.
Opportunities for cost reduction through finding different contractors depends heavily on
the contractors available in each neighborhood. Though Sharon Riley at Codman Square NDC
and Lizbeth Hire at JPNDC told stories of having high construction costs on their first projects
because their contractors were not experienced, both project managers have since found and hired
more experienced and less costly contractors. For example, Sharon Riley reduced construction
costs $20,000 from 47 Aspinwall Road to 55 Aspinwall Road by finding a better contractor.
However, experience with the program for both developers and contractors have improved
substantially since the program began. This suggests that after a certain amount of program
learning and experience has occurred, further construction cost reductions through the hiring of
small contractors will be unlikely.
Though some project managers have found contractors that are cost effective and
experienced, a more difficult task for a project manager at a CDC to accomplish is the creation of
long-term relationships with a number of cost effective small contractors. The creation of such
relationships has the potential to increase volume production as a CDC can use two cost effective
small contractors on two simultaneous development projects. In this regard, the experience of
Paula Harrington at NOAH is perhaps most instructive. Over a five year period Paula Harrington
has cultivated relationships with three small contractors whom she allows to bid on all projects
done by NOAH. According to Harrington, "they know that if they do good work and submit
reasonable bids, there will be work available for them in the future." Because the contractors also
know that there neighborhood competitors are bidding on the projects, the bid responses are
routinely within $100-200 of one another. Harrington has worked with all three contractors,
sometimes employing two on different simultaneous projects. This key component of outside
relationships adds flexibility to NOAH's development work, giving it more options do more work.
Importantly, the cost of having more options and flexibility in terms of scheduling construction
work does not increase as the contractors submit nearly equal bids. Being a licensed contractor
herself, she is very satisfied with the bids she receives and believes they are very reasonable. Her
experience as a contractor may force bid responders to be more responsible in with their cost
estimates.
Bid responses at Codman Square have varied more significantly among contractors than
those at NOAH. On 47 Aspinwall, construction bids ranged from $198,000 to $312,000.
Codman Square NDC chose the second lowest bidder at $202,000. Because of the contractors
inexperience, cost ran $20,000 over the bid amount on this project. On 55 Aspinwall bids ranged
from $197,200 to $221,000. Codman Square NDC chose the second lowest bidder at $198,000.
Recently a new contractor, Charles Joseph, has been submitting very low bids to Codman
Square NDC. This represents a possible cost reduction strategy for Codman Square NDC. On
17 Kenberma Road, contractor Charles Joseph submitted a bid of $157,000, substantially lower
than the other bids of $215,000, $213,000, and $204,000. Though the contract was awarded to
the second lowest bidder at $204,000 because Riley had trouble believing such low costs were
possible, she has since been affirmed of his quality reputation by a private developer whom she
respects. Thus, she plans to use Charles Joseph on upcoming rehabilitation projects as his bids
have the potential to reduce construction costs by $40,000 while maintaining the same scope of
work. Interestingly, Joseph's cost are much lower than the bids of either JPNDC or NOAH.
Why are Joseph's costs so low? None of these small contractors use union labor, so this
is not a plausible explanation. First, Joseph may be using a smaller number of subcontractors than
his competitors. That is, there is some correlation between number of subcontractors and
construction costs. Joseph may be doing most of the work himself or with his own crew and they
may have more trades in-house than competing contractors. Perhaps because he wants to become
established in lower Dorchester, he has deliberately set his price low (reducing his profit or
perhaps make none) in order to create a track record in the neighborhood. Because he is
experienced, a more likely explanation is that he has few subcontractors and is very experienced
working with triple-Decker houses. Thus, it is foreseeable that at Codman Square NDC,
construction costs could be reduced by $40,000 from their past $200,000-$220,000 level.
Certain aspects of the bidding process might lend themselves to high bid costs. For
example, the small contractors that Codman Square NDC asks to bid on projects know that an
architect is being used on the project (something most private developers do not use on
rehabilitation projects), that contractors are required to have insurance, and given the level of
construction (gut rehabilitation), Codman must have subsidy money available. Also, requirements
for security systems and the quality of the Codman office space might create an impression of
Codman having the ability to cover high costs. That is, Codman might appear well-capitalized
and too professional. If some costs are based on impressions, they may be even harder to control.
When compared to Codman the bid requirements and construction specifications of
NOAH do not differ substantially. If anything, they are slightly more detailed and lengthy. There
is not sufficient evidence to prove that level of detail in construction specifications is reflected in
cost. Interestingly, NOAH writes on page one of its bid package "these projects are subsidized by
the Public Facilities Department of the City of Boston and the Massachusetts Executive Office of
Communities and Development. there will be some paperwork necessary on your part to comply
with their requirements." 3 Evidently, knowledge of public subsidy does not cause bidders to
raise prices-presumably because there is a high degree of competition in the process.
" NOAH Bid Package for 53 Havre Street.
Internal Administrative Structure
The majority of Codman Square NDC's housing efforts are targeted in subarea 6 of its
twelve square block service area--an area bounded by Washington Street, Talbot Avenue, Morton
Street, and Harvard Street. Besides other one-shot multi-unit housing developments, Codman
Square NDC runs two housing rehabilitation programs: the 1-4 Family program and
Neighborhood Housing Services--a program which provides low-interest rehabilitation financing
to owner-occupants. Organizationally, Sharon Riley administers the 1-4 family program and
Marty Chapman runs the Neighborhood Housing Services program. Each program manager is
wholly responsible for all tasks associated with the program. These programs comprise the
majority of Codman Square NDC's housing work and two-thirds of its development team
staffing. To date, volume production in both programs has been lower than desired and Codman
Square NDC would like to see volume increase. An example of a successful purchase-
rehabilitation program that works in large volume is discussed in Chapter Eight.
While the recent reorganization of NHS in Boston may be limiting production (loan
origination) because operators at the CDC level faced considerable "start-up" periods and are
working out inherited bad loans, and while the 1-4 family program's bureaucratic complexity
might inhibit production for Codman Square NDC, intraorganizational issues at Codman Square
NDC might be limiting production as well--and this may simply be the result of ways of thinking
programmatically about community development. The two programs have different funding
sources. NRC funds NHS; LISC/BCLF fund the 1-4 Family Program. To some degree, NRC
and LISC are competitors in the technical assistance, capacity building, and funding world of
community development in Boston. Therefore, they would not necessarily encourage thinking
about administering the programs in a tandem/skill sharing way at Codman. At Codman, it is
assumed, perhaps at an unconscious level, that because there are two programs with two different
funding sources, there should therefore be two different program managers. At Codman Square
NDC, this might be a product of how tasks are thought about generally and learning from past
community development experiences.
This "large project" mentality is related to the historical experience Codman staff have
with multifamily development. In this past world, one project manager would work for perhaps
three years putting together a deal for a very large apartment building--sometimes with 200 or
more units. Being a project manager for such a large project is extremely time consuming. If a
CDC had two large projects, they would hire another project manager and each project manager
would be responsible for one project. At the end of the projects, the CDC would receive a fee of
10-12% and this would pay the project manager's salary and keep the CDC afloat. This method
of dividing labor made sense and was necessary. Deals were typically very different, consumed all
of the project manager's time, and might have had very different funding sources.14 The current
style of program separation at Codman Square NDC may be a remnant of organizational learning
which occurred at the CDC in a very different historical context. In the new environment of
program administration, a different organizational style may be necessary.
Codman Square NDC might consider administrating the 1-4 Family Program and the NHS
programs differently than the form currently practiced. For example, the two programs might be
seen as two slightly different strategies in a larger neighborhood stabilization initiative; that is,
" Thanks to Ken Wade of Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation for his analysis here.
though they are funded by different agencies, their goals are the same--rehabilitating housing and
stabilizing the target area. Further, some of the tasks or skills necessary to implement each
program overlap. Both programs involve marketing--the NHS markets loans, the 1-4 program
markets properties. Sharon Riley has an excellent marketing program in place, and has an
excellent knowledge of the Codman Square area and community. Coupling the marketing efforts
of both the 1-4 and NHS programs might save staff time and boost volume for Codman Square
NDC.
At the same time, the NHS program requires some contracting skills and knowledge of
rehabilitation. In fact, the NHS person at Codman gives homeowners advice on what to
rehabilitate in their homes. These skills, as they are in-house and already paid for in a yearly
salary, could be used to write rehabilitation specifications for the 1-4 family properties. NOAH
does rehabilitation specification writing in-house. This practice has saved them anywhere from
$3,000-$4,000 in direct fees on each individual project and shortened their carrying and
construction periods. In fact, architects are unnecessary in projects of the 1-4 family size unless
major structural changes are made. Also, new specification writing and drawing software could
enable another Codman Square NDC staff member to do these tasks. Further savings are made if
you do not pay an architect for construction management. This function could also be done in-
house by Marty Chapman as he worked for many years as a general contractor. In other words,
specialization, a greater use of in-house skills, and collaboration across the overlapping tasks of
each program might lead to higher volume production in both programs and reduced costs in the
1-4 Family program.
Thinking of rehabilitation programs broadly, the 1-4 family program can be seen in its
larger context. The 1-4 family program is one of numerous other rehabilitation programs in
existence. Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation runs a series of rehabilitation related
programs in Boston. One program, Neighborhood Housing Services, of which Codman Square
NDC is a member, small rehabilitation loans to owner-occupants. Another NRC program,
currently operating with Cambridge Neighborhood and Apartment Services, offers rehabilitation
financing to investor-owners with affordability covenants attached to the loans. Thus, there are
perhaps three rehabilitation programs in the Boston area which Codman could use--two funded by
NRC and one funded by LISC/BCLF/PFD. Two of these, NHS and the 1-4 family program, are
used by Codman Square NDC. The third type provides rehabilitation loans to investors and is
funded by NRC.
Outside the question of cost reduction for the 1-4 Family program, and thinking long-term
about Codman Square NDC's rehabilitation/stabilization strategy in its target area, other
rehabilitation programs are available. NRC, for example, offers low-interest construction
financing to investor-owners who want to rehabilitate their properties. These loans are originated
at the CDC level. While investor-owners have had negative impacts in the Codman Square area
historically, the Codman Square NDC might consider the benefits of such a program. First, CDCs
originating loans, subject to NRC's approval, screen investors should they have speculative,
quick-flip tendencies. Second, affordability covenants are attached to the loans that ensure the
production of affordable housing. Third, such a system relieves the CDC capacity limitations by
in effect transferring project management functions from the CDC to a private investor. In the
end, houses are rehabilitated, units are affordable, the neighborhood is stabilized, and considerable
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screening at loan origination ensures that borrowers will not become irresponsible landlords.
Cambridge Neighborhood and Apartment Services currently runs this type of program with NRC.
While Codman Square NDC may not want to become a "bank" for investors (it currently offers
bank loans for owners), such a model is useful to think about, especially for long-term
stabilization strategies with or without the 1-4 family program administration.
Soft Costs
At Codman Square NDC, general development costs (permitting, marketing, interest,
insurance, and architecture fees) do not differ substantially from other CDCs analyzed. However,
differences are large enough to find cost reduction tactics. Comparing two projects, Codman
Square NDC paid $2,000 more than the $5,000 paid by NOAH for architectural services, just
$720 more for marketing, and $1,000 more than NOAH's $2,200 for insurance15 . Among the ten
projects analyzed, architectural services have ranged from 5,000 to $7,334. These costs depend
on the level of structural design a project needs, but also the level of detail in construction
specifications. Construction costs have also varied from $2,500 to $6,000. Codman Square
NDC paid $1,300 more in construction interest than NOAH's $3,800. NOAH paid $1,000 more
for legal services than Codman did. These created a difference in general development costs of
nearly eight thousand dollars between the two CDCs. This suggest opportunities for reducing
some aspects of soft costs exist--especially the categories of insurance, construction
administration, and architectural services. CDCs have considerably less control over other soft
costs in the 1-4 Family program.
15 A recent revamping of Codman Square NDC's insurance policy with a elastic pool is projected to decrease
insurance by %50 while doubling the coverage.
Chapter Six: Costs That Codman Can't Directly Control: Program Requirements That Constrain
All CDCs Using the 1-4 Family Program
Externally Imposed Costs
The 1-4 Family program relies on a complicated set of funding sources to successfully
rehabilitate homes for sale to income-qualified first time home buyers. The multiple funders
involved and the use of two different types of public subsidies, HOME and CDBG money (each
with its own restrictions), create a situation in which the number of legal transactions is
considerably more than in a conventional development scenario. As such, legal fees are numerous
and their number increase program costs. What follows is an analysis of each program funders
risks and goals it wants to achieve with the program. The difference (disjuncture) between how
risks and rewards are defined by each funder creates the numerous constrains which, from the
point of view of CDCs, are excessive.
Given that a substantial portion of soft costs incurred by Codman are caused by fees
resulting from externally imposed requirements of the 1-4 Family program, a means of reducing
costs is to remove unnecessary requirements. The high number of externally imposed
requirements of the 1-4 Family program are designed to control risks perceived by program
funders. In order to assess requirements that could be removed or redesigned for cost reduction
purposes, I analyze the risks each program funder sees for the program. What are the interests
and perceived risks of each program funder and how are they to be mitigated?
The Public Facilities Department has been heavily criticized by CDCs for causing lengthy
closings and increasing the amount of interest paid on construction financing. Recently, PFD was
criticized in a Boston Globe editorial on the 1-4 Family program:
Nonprofit housing groups are hemorrhaging staff time and legal delays. Consider:...a
project manager (at PFD) misplaces specifications for a Magnolia Street property in
Roxbury, resulting in a two-month lag for state funding. In East Boston, a first-time home
buyer get hung up on Havre Street when the city fails to discharge a mortgage because of
requirements that don't seem to apply elsewhere. On Walden Street in Jamaica Plain, a
neighborhood development group risks losing its contractor because the city's "One Stop"
application sits for weeks on a desk a the Public Facilities Department.16
Besides acknowledgments of understaffing in its legal department, and its status as a public
agency, few other reasons have been cited for PFD's dawdling.
Much of PFD's apparent dawdling occurs because of requirements that PFD imposed
when it agreed to commit CDBG money to the 1-4 Family program. For example, PFD has a
design review process with in-house architects that review rehabilitation plans for the 1-4 Family
program. Though the design review process for the 1-4 Family program was streamlined after
CDCs voiced opposition to it, the mere existence of such a review adds time to the development
process for CDCs. That a licensed architect at PFD is required to review the design of a licensed
architect hired by Codman's project manager is perhaps unnecessary. Why does it exist? Because
the program receives public subsidy, PFD is interested in ensuring the production of an attractive
housing product. Voters see this product. The mayor and PFD are interested in constituency
satisfaction. At the same time, PFD has published documents discussing methods of streamlining
its processes and such streamlining is demanded by the public as it reduces PFD's costs.
16 "Housing Maintenance in Boston," The Boston Globe, March 31,1997.
However, there appears to be a difference between PFD's stated goals of efficiency and the
practice of work at PFD.
At the same time, PFD is interested in spreading subsidy over as many projects as possible
so they can take credit for more work and claim that their subsidies produce positive
neighborhood impacts. This explains PFD's insistence on receiving matching funds from the state
for each 1-4 Family project. The matching process adds a layer of paperwork for CDCs and
program funders as CDC project managers must fill out "one-stop" applications and submit them
to both PFD and DHCD. Both of these attributes of the program (the design review and the
requirement that subsidies be matched by the state) are politically motivated requirements. While
the requirements may serve the political objectives of the mayor and PFD, they do increase the
production of affordable housing--a goal which is ostensibly more important. Unnecessary
reviews and unnecessary paper work slow projects down, and increase financing and staff costs.
The Boston Globe writes, PFD "must take special care that future (affordable housing) efforts
don't collapse through tax title delays, lax payment processing, or other bureaucratic blunders."1 7
As a private intermediary with community development objectives, the Local Initiatives
Support Corporation has a complicated set of goals. In addition to its goals of building the
capacity of CDCs through technical assistance and financial support, LISC is very concerned
about not losing money. LISC's construction financing for the program is loaned at an interest
rate of roughly five percent. When asked why the design of the 1-4 Family program all but
nullifies risk, LISC's Mat Thall says, "we do not want to lose $800,000 dollars on a project and
we do not want to lose $80,000 on a project." This risk averse concern is manifested in a high
"7 ibid.
level of program oversight. As discussed earlier, LISC and BCLF employ a construction
supervisor. This oversight is costly in terms of staff time and a "loss" similar to one experienced if
a small number of projects fail due to inadequate oversight. Unlike PFD, LISC is not heavily
concerned about design. They are interested primarily in housing people and creating
reinvestment in low-income communities with the 1-4 Family program.
In contrast to LISC, the Boston Community Loan Fund does not have technical assistance
and capacity building objectives for neighborhood organizations. It does not run programs geared
to meet such objectives. Rather, BCLF is a community lender that makes capital available for
neighborhoods and projects that are normally not given access to capital. Supported by Boston
area church and non-profit money, BCLF makes loans, prices mortgages, and mitigates project
risk using the same practices as conventional banks. BCLF construction financing is loaned at an
interest rate of roughly seven percent. BCLF is concerned primarily about its return and security
of return. Getting their money back enables them to continue to loan money out. Currently,
financing for the 1-4 Family program is non-recourse. BCLF mitigates risk on non-recourse notes
by exercising a considerable degree of project oversight in the 1-4 Family program. They share a
construction supervisor with LISC and sign all requisitions as does LISC. Program and finance
servicing fees pay for the construction supervisor. An increase of risk tolerance or the use of
other risk mitigation techniques might reduce program costs without increasing the number of
failed projects.
The state Department of Housing and Community Development has a set of objectives
similar to PFD. DHCD is interested in minimizing their investment in each project. They are also
interested in spreading their subsidy (federal entitlement money) around an a statewide basis.
Their perception n of risk is that once they put their money in a project, they are committed for
the long-term. That is, they have to give more money if cost overruns occur. The only value to a
public entity is to have a project completed. DHCD's concerns about risk are mitigated by two
factors. One, a project manager at PFD who is responsible for monitoring the progress of a
project. Two, DHCD money is the last money to fund 1-4 Family projects and is only given out
when it projects are 90% completed. DHCD exercises no oversight other than the
straightforward "one-stop" application that it requires CDCs to submit to DHCD and PFD.
The incentives and priorities of the different agencies involved are not complementary and
create a system of requirements that is not efficient. LISC is currently quite risk averse. Mat
Thall stated in an interview that LISC is unwilling to lose any money on any 1-4 Family projects
that might fail due to reducing the level of oversight in Program. Even LISC's NCDI "funders
think it may have become too conservative (not taking more risks in response to pullbacks by the
City, State and banks)." 8 In the 1-4 Family Housing Program Memorandum of Understanding,
PFD states that if it finds that CDCs operating under the 1-4 Family program "fail to implement a
production system to efficiently buy, renovate, and sell properties to low and moderate-income
home buyers, it will reallocate funds to CDCs that are performing well." This is a curious threat
because while PFD expects efficiency, it fails to acknowledge the labyrinthine requirements,
unnecessary design review, and lengthy closings that PFD imposes in the development process for
CDCs in the 1-4 Family Program--requirements that cause delays and decrease efficiencies for
CDCs.1 9
18 Mat Thall directs the Boston LISC office. This quote was not necessarily pointed to the 1-4 Program but
concerned Boston LISC in general. NCDI III Proposal, LISC Boston, December 1996.
19 "1-4 Family Housing Program Memorandum of Understanding," pages 4-5, November 1994, BCLF.
PFD requires a design review for all project receiving PFD subsidy, not just the 1-4 Family
Program. The primary goal of the design review process is to "make it clear to developers and
architects what PFD's standards are for appropriate, cost-effective, high quality design, and
construction. The notion of cost-effectiveness is absurd. A design review process that can
take anywhere from two to four weeks is costly. For a Codman Square, costs during such a
process exist for interest on acquisition loans (if they are used, at 5-7% interest rate), insurance
($200-300 over two-three weeks), taxes ($1,000), additional risks of holding property such as
damage to vacant buildings, foregone work with the money that is invested in the property, and a
loss of reputation for not developing properties faster. Labor costs for Codman Square NDC (at
$25-30 per hour) are incurred to have Codman staff gather and follow design review paperwork
through the design review process. Labor costs alone approach $1600, while total "costs" that
PFD imposes on Codman Square NDC approach $2,800.
PFD also state in the Memorandum of Understanding that "no later that substantial
completion of a product, PFD will disburse its loan, including repaying BCLF/LISC directly for
all portions disbursed to bridge PFD.",2 This has not occurred. For example, PFD's
understaffing and lack of a "time is money" mentality slows project down and increases work
costs at Codman Square NDC. The entire development process was lengthened five months for
Codman Square NDC's project at 47 Aspinwall Road because of unclear billing requirements.
PFD took over five months to close on the deal with NOAH because of lost paperwork at PFD.
Construction began on 47 Aspinwall in January of 1996 and ended in April. PFD, however, did
not close until September. This increased the amount of interest due on the LISC/BCLF financing
20 Public Facilities Department Design Review Guidelines.
2 "1-4 Family Housing Program Memorandum of Understanding," page 4.
and is one source of the program's high costs. In this case, the cost is wholly unnecessary. In the
meantime, Codman Square NDC's successful marketing program had selected an income qualified
buyer and a conventional lender had agreed to make mortgage financing available. The buyer was
forced to wait to move into their house because of PFD.
Experiences at other CDCs have been similar too. Costs incurred at JPNDC because of
PFD repeated lengthy closings. One project took PFD six months to close, costing JPNDC
$13,000--money that PFD said it would repay to JPNDC in acknowledgment of its own untimely
behavior. JPNDC has yet to recoup this $13,000 amount. A project completed in November has
yet to be closed on by PFD at this time. This lack of available cash limits JPNDC's ability to
acquire additional properties for the 1-4 family program and limits their volume of production.
NOAH has had similar experiences as well.
Fee structure
The fee structure of the 1-4 Family program is peculiar and suggests that developers have
incentives to drive costs up. Currently, Codman Square, like all CDCs participating in the 1-4
Family program, receives fees based on 10% of a project's total development cost less
contingency, fee, and overhead. Overhead compensation is based on 10% of a project's total
development cost less contingency, fee and overhead. Thus, Codman Square NDC hopes to get
20% out of any given project. On 47 and 55 Aspinwall, Codman Square NDC received $15,761
and 17,000 respectively in fees and overhead combined. On 82 Wheatland Avenue, Codman
Square expects to receive $33,636. This larger amount is expected because CDCs receive more
money back when they fund their required 10% equity contribution to the project with their own
money. Any "outside" money (grants from other agencies for example) used is acknowledged by
PFD in its fee and overhead distribution, and fees to Codman Square are reduced.
Regardless, according to the fee structure of the 1-4 Family program, as long as a Codman
Square does not use up its contingency amount with cost overruns, and as long as it does not
exceed the expected per unit gap subsidy agreed upon by PFD at the time of a project's approval,
Codman Square NDC cannot have its fee reduced as a "penalty". Therefore, under the terms of
the program, Codman Square NDC should always push the subsidy amount and construction cost
upward to the level of PFD's expected per unit gap subsidy of $43,000-50,000, thereby increasing
its equity reserves through fee and overhead compensation. The required equity contribution,
unlike the fee, does not increase with total development costs because the equity contribution is
based on expected appraised value, not total project cost. Thus, Codman Square has an incentive
to keep costs high enough to receive a nice fee, but take steps not to use up contingency
allowances. There is no incentive to find a cheap contractor, just one that will stay within a large
budget.22
Another strategy, suggested by Ken Wade and also talked about by Mat Thall, would be
to offer 1-4 family program manager's a flat fee per each unit of housing produced. In
conjunction with this, you might offer developers a bigger percentage of unspent contingency
costs-- for example, let them keep a dollar for every dollar they save. Of the six projects Codman
Square NDC plans to finish by the end of 1997, two of which are already completed, the
projected average fee for each project will be over $20,000. If a CDC had a volume of ten houses
per year, that would be $200,000 in fees. For program funders, a flat compensation fee would be
22 "1-4 Family Housing Program Memorandum of Understanding," November 1994, BCLF.
less costly. Codman Square NDC expects in $125,000 fees from completing six projects. These
fees could pay two or three salaried people doing both NHS and purchase rehabilitation projects
and lowering the total development costs by not requiring fees. This would of course would
depend on the capital source for Codman Square NDC salaries. Also, it might help to keep the
built in profit-making structure so CDCs can fund future programs. 23
Conclusions on Costs
In light of the above discussion in chapters six and seven about costs, is a best case
scenario possible in which a public subsidy is unnecessary or substantially reduced? That is, could
CDCs do rehabilitation with just LISC and BCLF and without a PFD subsidy. "One could
develop for a cost less than the sale price," even while maintaining the product scope goals of a
CDC says Mike Stella. Stella, a Codman Square NDC board member and head of Star
Contracting, believes this could only be done if acquisition costs were very low and if a given
developer worked with a building that did not require large amounts of work.
Assuming acquisition costs remained at the low level of 47 and 55 Aspinwall and
properties were continued to be acquired through the city or an intermediary in the $2,000-8,000
range. In the past, Codman Square NDC has been able to get fairly low acquisition prices
because of its strong relationships with banks and other intermediaries holding foreclosed
property. Hiring Charles Joseph as a contractor would reduce construction costs by 20-25%, or
$30,000-40,000 less than Codman's previous construction costs. These strategies would greatly
reduce the need for public subsidy from PFD. However, costs cannot be further reduced by
23 The contingency fee is based on %10 of construction costs. PFD 1-4 Family Program: Statement of Additional
Agreements among PFD, LISC, BCLF, November 22, 1994, pages 4-5.
Codman Square unless unnecessary external requirements are eliminated or unless the scope of
work is reduced.
Chapter Seven: Learning From Those Outside the 1-4 Family Program: Doing Moderate Instead
of Gut Rehabilitation, A Private Gut Rehabber, and A Successful Non-Profit Rehabber
Doing Moderate Instead of Gut Rehabilitation
If costs cannot be reduced to a reasonable level that would greatly reduce the amount of
needed public subsidy, or if the program ended and Codman Square NDC were to think about
doing its own rehabilitation for affordable housing program, it would be necessary to examine two
questions: (1) how must the scope of work be reduced to have costs conform more closely to a
market-driven rehabilitation scenario--what are the key pieces of work to be done, what is not
absolutely necessary? (2) how do the handful of private developers who rehabilitate properties in
the Codman Square area behave when making decisions about what pieces of the structure to
save or replace? If the answers to this question mean doing moderate rehabilitation, what savings
would accrue if moderate rehabilitation was practiced? What "dangers" would occur if moderate
rehabilitation was practiced and how can such dangers be mitigated?
Some housing rehabilitation is conducted by investors or owners working outside of any
publicly financed rehabilitation program in the low-income neighborhoods served by Boston
CDCs. The sale prices of these rehabilitated units are often less than those of the 1-4 family
projects, often because rehabilitation done by private individuals is less rigorous and complete.
That is, private individuals might do moderate rehabilitation (saving and patching walls and most
of the systems serving the house) while a CDC doing rehabilitation will generally do gut
rehabilitation.
A simple response to the problem of high rehabilitation costs, and a strategy used by
private developers, is to reduce the level rehabilitation. In the community development world,
this response is viewed as irresponsible. Reducing the scope of work inevitably means that
developer's shift cost burden's to owner of the house--cost the owner will bear in the future when
capital depreciates. Recently, the housing market in Codman Square has stabilized after the early
1990s crash. In response, private developers reduce their scope of work when acquisition costs
rise. This is because while acquisition cost might rise considerably over time, the market can only
bear sale price increases to a certain level. If developers plan to get $20,000 out of a
rehabilitation job, they will work up to the point where their costs are $20,000 below the expected
sale price. Putting more money into a rehabilitation project might mean exceeding the price for
which one could sell a house to moderate income buyers in the housing market.
Codman Square cannot fully adopt such a practice of reducing its scope of work because
its objectives inhibit it from adopting this market model. However, in thinking of continuing to
develop triple-deckers for home ownership as part of a long-term stabilization strategy (perhaps in
the absence of the 1-4 Family Program's public subsidy) it might be necessary for Codman Square
NDC to do moderate instead of gut rehabilitation. Currently, CDCs aim to provide rehabilitated
units that will not need any major repairs for at least 10-15 years. This number may be too high.
First, over time it is safe to assume that the buyer's of these units will have some upward mobility
as owner's salaries increase with labor market experience. Being able to navigate the home
purchase process is a testament to this. Further, families with small children might expect their
household income to increase as adult children begin working and stay at home. Both of these
facts increase the ability of homeowners to bear cost burdens in the future. Other affordable
housing experts do not believe this argument about the ability of home owners to assume added
debt in the future--arguing instead that the incomes of lower-income populations grow slower
than costs of living. 4 If debt for maintenance will be needed in the future and home owners will
not be able to assume such debt, new subsidies will be needed in the future for home owners.
A CDC has to accomplish both goals of rehabilitating the inside and the outside of a
property. Rehabilitating the inside serves the new home owners and fixing the exterior improves
the neighborhood. But in terms of costs, systems are the most expensive and those that the CDC
does not want to pass along to low-income buyers. Figure 3 sets forth a scenario which looks at
foregoing certain pieces of rehabilitation (patching rather than replacing sheetrock for example)
and looking at home equity loans for homeowners in the future. Mortgage values are based on
past Codman Square 1-4 Family project sales. If a CDC were to forego $35,000 of rehabilitation
work today by eliminating "unnecessary" cost items such as new dry wall installation,
maintenance costs to a given home buyer would increase in the future. The foregone $35,000 of
rehabilitation work would cost $50,000 in year 13. Assuming that a home buyer would need
outside financing to cover maintenance costs, and assuming a home owner could obtain a home-
equity loan of $50,000 based on a 5% mortgage equity level and an increased home value in year
13, the home owners yearly debt service payments would increase from $8,840 to $14,861.
However, the present value of this $14,861 payment, discounted at 3% is $9,553. Therefore with
14 Based on analysis of Ann Houston, Codman Square NDC.
home-equity loan at year 13, a home buyer's debt service would increase just 12% in real dollars.
Because rental income covers such a large portion of debt service for 1-4 Family home buyers,
yearly payments for owners would increase, in real dollars from the current $540 per year to just
$594 per year in year 13. This analysis suggests that if a CDC were to significantly reduce the
level of rehabilitation currently practiced, they would not negatively effect a home owners ability
to meet debt service obligations or, for that matter, negatively effect neighborhood stability.2 s
Codman Square NDC aims to produce a product that will not need capital replacement for
10-15 years. Doing this means that buyers will incur fewer maintenance costs in the future. Thus,
for a CDC interested in keeping buyers in their homes, maintaining good community rapport, and
creating a high-quality housing stock contributing to neighborhood stabilization, moderate
rehabilitation might create a situation in which homeowners become debt burdened with high
maintenance costs. Such a situation would hurt a Codman' s community image and potentially
destabilize the neighborhood. A possible solution? Perhaps Codman could set up a capital
reserve to fund future maintenance problems with a large number of moderately-rehabilitated
buildings. This capital reserve might be less costly than continuing to look for development gap
subsidies which might not be reliable in years to come. The capital reserve system, however, is
legally complicated and involves high opportunity costs as using allocating capital for reserves
now means not doing additional development work today. Capital constrained Codman Square
NDC needs to actively use their money. And while capital reserves are common in tax credit
deals, less equity is available in the 1-4 Family properties.
2 This analysis suggests Ken Wade of NRC is correct in his argument that rehabilitation levels could be reduced
and future maintenance costs could be borne by home owners.
Home owners in the 1-4 Family Program are only expected to pay $65 per month of their
own money toward mortgage debt service. If Codman Square opts to reduce the level of
rehabilitation in its 1-4 Family projects, and if in the future some home owners are not able to
assume added debt for maintenance, steering home owners to a subsidized financing program like
Neighborhood Housing Services might be the best way of keeping home owners in their homes.
Such as strategy assumes an on-going institutionalized relationship between a unit of affordable
home ownership housing and a state subsidized housing finance organization. Another method of
reducing costs and increasing volume would be to look at successful non-profit developers
specializing in rehabilitation who operate outside of the 1-4 Family Program.
Jim Paley
Jim Paley runs New Haven Housing Services in New Haven, Connecticut. As a member
of Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation's Neighborworks organization, he has access to
Neighborhood Housing Services financing and, through his contacts with local banks, access to
construction financing to do purchase-rehabilitation projects. Last year, he originated 20 NHS
owner-rehabilitation loans and 12 purchase-rehabilitation projects. This is a very high volume.
His purchase-rehabilitation projects are very similar to the LISC/BCLF 1-4 Family program.
Development gaps are filled with CDBG money or HOME money, though he has no subsidy
long-term subsidy commitments. In comparison, Codman Square NDC did two purchase-
rehabilitation projects and two owner-rehabilitation loans. Though, to Codman Square NDC's
defense, the small number of owner-rehabilitation loans was caused because most of Marty
Chapman's efforts focused on working out bad loans from a portfolio Codman Square NDC's
inherited from NHS' old organizational structure.2 6
Why was Paley so successful? First, his owner-rehabilitation activity was not hampered by
a messy portfolio. Second, his purchase-rehabilitation activity was not inhibited by a tangled
program organization structure imposed by project funders. He went to banks, they lent him
money on the condition his CDBG money was in place, and he rehabilitated properties. Because
he does not have large monetary commitments from public agencies in place, he is subjected to
less scrutiny. PFD and EOCD each committed $3.5 million to the 1-4 Family program over four
years. As a result, they exercise a considerable amount of regulatory might. He was his own
construction manager. There were not multiple requisitions paid out by the bank. Only one. The
banks lend on their faith in Paley's reputation and his ability to oversee the construction
management process. From the bank's perspective, the small amount of financing at risk does not
warrant the labor costs of hiring their own construction monitor to visit the site.
While Paley's success is partially due to his comparative lack of externally imposed
constraints, constraints which Codman Square NDC must face, his success is also due to the
internal environment of his organization and its approach to the rehabilitation question. In-house,
Paley has two other people who work with him. One deals primarily with marketing, the other
with development and construction management, and among them specifications for rehabilitation
projects are written. This is not the case at Codman Square NDC, as discussed in Chapter Six.
Thus, model housing work on that of Jim Paley's organization is a potential way for Codman to
increase its volume production.
26 Thanks to Ken Wade of Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation for his analysis of Paley's work and success.
Steve La Rosa, a Boston Rehabber and a Profitable One Too
Known for doing high-quality work, Steve La Rosa is a contractor turned developer who
makes his living rehabilitating triple-decker housing. Construction budgets for most
rehabilitation jobs are in the $70,000 range. When he uses bank financing for construction
purposes, costs rise into the $80,000 range, a construction budget nearly half that of the ten CDC
projects analyzed earlier. He uses his own acquisition financing-a cheap, zero-interest approach
that is quick because he does not have to apply for special grants or loans or wait for them to
come through. He rehabilitates 24 triple-decker properties per year which is a very high
production level when compared to Jim Paley. Jim Paley does ten projects per year and is
considered remarkable for a non-profit developer. The triple-deckers La Rosa sells are in the
$140,000-160,000 range in Hyde Park, West Roxbury, and Jamaica Plain. He has sold triple-
deckers for up to $150,000 in Dorchester in areas with stronger markets than Codman Square.
On any given project, he aims to net out 15% after paying his crew and materials costs.
When asked why his projects are cheap, he says "because they (CDCs) pay everyone the
rate," not only referring to the wages (and profits) of subcontractors, but fees to banks and
lawyers. His crew is inexpensive, primarily because they only subcontract on sheet rock
installation, plaster, plumbing, and electric. Substantial saving occur by not contracting. When
asked would he ever bid on a Codman Square NDC project, "no, why work for them when I can
work for myself."27
" Steve La Rosa interview.
What are the lessons from La Rosa for the 1-4 Family program? First, the costs of the
externally imposed requirements are significant and substantial saving of time and money could
occur if they were eliminated. They eat up $40,000-$55,000 of money per project. Would it be
possible to do rehabilitation if the program ended?
If the program ended, what would costs have been on 55 Aspinwall Road? A
conservative estimate would reduce Codman Square's development costs by $40,000-$50,000.
Depending on how one calculates soft costs due to using the 1-4 Family Program, interest costs,
and whether or not a CDC uses and architect or writes their construction specifications in-house,
cost could be reduced by $60,000. La Rosa has a lower fee and overhead than CDCs. La Rosa
hopes to get 15% of a rehabilitation projects sales price out for fees and overhead and relies on a
high production volume for his personal income. CDCs, in contrast, receive overhead
compensation based on 10% of total development costs and fees based on 10% of total
development costs. While the 1-4 Family program's fee structure aims to build equity for CDCs
and should be maintained, another system could build CDC equity by offering greater
compensation to CDCs who reduce other costs.
The example of Steve La Rosa provides a way of thinking about reducing the costs of the
1-4 Family program by convincing lenders and PFD to streamline the development process for
CDCs such as Codman Square using the program. At the same time, it suggests that if Codman
Square had access to construction financing, it might be able to conduct housing rehabilitation
even if the 1-4 Family Program is discontinued.
Chapter Eight: Recommendations and Conclusion
The following are recommended methods of reducing labor, time, and construction costs
of the 1-4 Family Program. A conclusion follows about strategies that Codman Square NDC can
pursue to reduce costs in the 1-4 Family Program.
The Development Process
" Enrollment--An alternative strategy might have PFD agree in advance to allocate a large sum
of subsidy to CDCs participating in the 1-4 family program and have a positive design review
imply subsidy availability.
e Requisitions-Having funders sign requisitions and having construction supervisors working for
funders is unnecessary, especially on projects costing less than $300,000 like the 1-4 family
program. Adopting a more simple approach like that of a conventional private rehabilitation
project would be more efficient--allow CDCs to certify the requisition and allow draw downs
on lines of credit to occur with no or substantially less lender oversight. Viewed on the wide
scale of the 160 projects completed under the program, the costs incurred in labor and interest
by the funder signature requirement are likely more than those that would be incurred if a few
of the 160 projects failed due to inadequate oversight.
" Closings-Substantial pressure should be placed on PFD, not simply by LISC but by CDCs
acting together, to quicken the process. Possibly, CDC development fees should be increased
for days past three weeks that closing do not occur after paperwork has been submitted by
CDCs to PFD.
Costs
The Acquisition Problem
e Volume purchase strategies should be pursued with intermediaries (Fannie Mae, etc.), even if
they are not holding many properties currently--plan for future acquisition
e Ignoring site-specific considerations, CDCs have an incentive to get cheaper properties from
the city.
e Periodic mailings and purchase offers to absentee landlords and those owners who repeatedly
fall into tax title issues is a potential non-time consuming acquisitions strategy. Non-intensive,
worthwhile
e Develop relationships with brokers
e Negotiate with city directly, or through LISC, for a quicker disposition of city owned
property using state's new housing bond intergovernmental coordination requirement as a
lure, think of disposition for this program and for other future development projects as well
e A volume purchase strategy cuts staff time at the Codman Square NDC, creates a predictable
environment of volume production for the period it would take to rehabilitate the number of
properties held, and possibly would produce significant neighborhood impacts by putting
properties on the market at once (assuming enough income qualified buyers were assembled).
" If Codman Square NDC does not have an adequate pool of acquisition capital available for a
volume purchase, apply for acquisition loans either through LISC or CEDAG.
Acquisition
e Avoid high acquisition costs by trying to buy properties in bundles, or volume to get lower
prices
e work with brokers for volume purchases to reduce per property prices
e rely on strategy for lower priced properties from the city and intermediaries in periods of price
escalation
e assemble large pool of acquisition capital to make acquisition in periods of price escalation
easier
Construction, Contracting, Bidding
e Cultivate relationships with small contractors to educate them about 1-4 Family program
goals and let them know of Codman Square NDC's long term commitment to neighborhood
and future development projects
e encourage contractors to use fewer subcontractors in order to reduce costs
e exchange information about program funding and subsidy, like NOAH, make it clear and
make information available
e hire Charles Joseph and reduce costs by X percentage
e try to get Steve La Rosa to do three or four projects at once to make it more profitable for
him
Soft Costs
* write construction specifications in-house using either Marty Chapman's skills or by
purchasing new spec writing software, cut $2,000 from project costs
e reduce level of detail on architectural drawings, save $2,000. Have NOAH's in-house
architectural draftsperson do overtime work for Codman Square NDC
* Encourage other CDCs to structure their insurance packages like Codman Square NDC, save
$1,000 per property
e couple marketing efforts of the NHS and 1-4 Family program to cut staff time, costs, and
boost production
Externally imposed requirements
e Cut PFD design review process entirely-use the saving of staff costs at PFD as a hook to
convince them-no one needs a licensed architect at PFD inspecting the work of another
licensed architect hired by a CDC
e Push LISC to assume more risk and get rid of required funders signatures on paperwork
work with BCLF to find out how they might mitigate perceived risks-Codman Square NDC
has lots of assets that could easily be used as recourse on development projects. As recourse is
typically valued at 30-40% of project, only $60,000-80,000 of Codman Square capital would
be threatened under a recourse deal. Such recourse may allow LISC/BCLF to remove much
oversight
" have DHCD allow PFD to do the match in-house
have LISC lean on PFD with carrot of new state housing bill's coordination requirement to
demonstrate tighter coordination between city government and non-profits in carrying out
community development agendas
e PFD's design review is unnecessary. CDCs should be treated as private owners and not
subjected to rigorous design review because they are receiving funds from PFD.
" Rather than having a matching system between DHCD and PFD, it might be simpler to
obtain funding allocations from each agency and have each agency fund entire development
gaps at once, though legally federal entitlement money does not allow this. Or each CDC
could be assigned to either DHCD or PFD for gap funding, thus eliminating time costs and a
source of frustration at the CDC level--if not for all parties involved. PFD's reputation of
taking too long to close inevitably lengthens the process and drives up the total payments due
for construction loan interest.
Internal Administrative Structure
e think in tandem/skill sharing manner to administrate housing programs at Codman Square
NDC, boost production and cut costs as a result
" get construction specification writing software
* market both NHS and 1-4 Family program under one person
e work with Codman Square NDC's community organizer Elvira Campbell to help market
e better utilize in-house skills, have Marty Chapman write construction specifications
e think long-term about other NRC funded rehabilitation programs (loans to investor owners)
and doing small property rehabilitation in absence of PFD subsidy (prepare for the worst)
e investigate loans to investors via NRC with affordability covenants attached
Fee Structure
e have LISC offer a flat fee for projects
e above a flat fee, create an incentive laden system that lets CDCs make more money for the
more money they save
e pressure LISC to properly structure incentives so Codman Square NDC can really push to cut
costs
Lessons from Private Developers About 1-4 Family Program Design
e External Requirements cost $55,000 per project
e Simplify the paperwork, paperwork takes time away from acquiring land and developing
properties
e lender requirements, "need to be analyzed with an eye to simplification and avoidance of
duplication"
e institutional support and technical assistance are focused on asset and property management
rather than volume production for the eleven CDCs administering the 1-4 Family program
Conclusion
With the above recommendations in mind, Codman Square NDC can pursue three
potential strategies in its use of the 1-4 Family Program. Their success or relevance is dependent
on market changes within Boston, economic changes at the regional/national level, and the impact
of the 1-4 Family program on neighborhood housing markets where rehabilitation work is
conducted.
"Strategy 1" would be one of hiring a low-bidding contractor such as Charles Joseph.
Joseph has submitted bids to Codman Square NDC that would reduce Codman Square's
construction costs, and therefore total development costs per property, by $30,000-40,000 from
previous amounts. At the same time, Codman Square NDC should cultivate relationships with
contractors to educate them about the 1-4 Family Program, the on-going work of Codman Square
NDC, and to form a competitive pool of bidders.
"Strategy 2" would be one of working with other CDCs to convince LISC, BCLF, and
PFD to radically streamline the requirements of the 1-4 Family Program. This strategy would use
the example of Steve La Rosa as proof that one can perform gut rehabilitations and remain
profitable if only one is free of excessive programmatic constraints. Fewer constraints mean not
only fewer legal fees but shorter construction periods and lower interest costs. If the 1-4 Family
program were substantially streamlined, costs would be reduced $40,000-60,000 per project.
"Strategy 3" would be one of conducting moderate rather than gut rehabilitation in the 1-4
Family Program. If the scope of rehabilitation work currently practiced were reduced to a
reasonable level that still ensured the development of high-quality housing, 1-4 Family
development costs could be reduced $40,000-50,000 per building. Concerns about expecting
home owners to assume high maintenance costs or too much debt in the future would be
mitigated by steering such owners to the Neighborhood Housing Services program.
The most cost-effective strategy, however, would be to pursue the above three strategies
in combination. If all three strategies were implemented and effective, Codman Square NDC
could reduce the total development costs by nearly half from the $250,000-280,000 levels of 47
and 55 Aspinwall Road, Codman's two completed 1-4 Family projects to date.
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FIGURE 2
COMPARATIVE COSTS OF 1-4 FAMILY PROJECTS
CDC CSNDC CSNDC CSNDC NOAH NOAH HOAH JPNDC JPNDC JPNDC JPNDC AVERAGE
Project 47 Aspinwall 55 Aspinwall 17 Kenberma 149 Putnam 309 Saratoga 53 Havre St. 61 Walden St. 85 Chestnut 73 Walden 108 Minden
Units 3,3 3,3 3,3 3,2 3,2 3,2 3,2 3,3 2,2 3,3
A/E 7,334 5,640 400 6500 5,000 5,000 10,500 6,500 10000 9000
Const. Adm. 5,336 3,360 6,000 2500 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 6+7 12,670 9,000 6,400 9,000 5,000 5,000 10,500 6,500 10,000 9,000 8,307
Acquisition 7,443 2,000 13,000 15,000 7,500 50,000 2,000 0 18,500 85500 20,094
Construction 219,854 199,000 225,314 126,000 124,190 137,500 204,636 115500 165,000 140800 165,779
TDC 281,823 250,666 288,946 199,000 196,792 250,000 288,291 177600 254000 294900 248,202
Square Ft. 3,297 3,354 3,200 1,872 1,656 1,415 3712 3100 2413 3000 2,702
Acq./sq.ft. 2 1 4 8 5 35 1 0 8 29 9
Const./sq.ft. 67 59 70 67 75 97 55 37 68 47 64
$TDC/sg.ft. 85 75 90 106 119 177 78 57 105 98 99
TDC/unit 93,941 83,555 96,315 99,500 98,396 125,000 144,146 59,200 127,000 98,300 102,535
Sale Price 125,000 125,000 125,000 90,000 100,000 115,000 115,000 130,600 129,000 130,000 118,460
Date 6/0/96 2/0/97 4/0/97 12/30/93 3/23/94 2/0/97 9/10/94 10/3/96 2/6/97 3/6/97
FIGURE 3
HOME OWNER EOUITYLEVEL OF REHABIUTATION ANALYSIS
Sales Pice
Buyer Equity
Soft Second (20% first mitg.)
Fhist Mortgage
Int. Rale/Yr
Pedrod-Yeats
Scenarlo I
OLB
Yeady Payment
Interest
Pidncipal
Percent Equity
125,000
6,250
23.750
95.000
8.50%
30
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 10 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
95,000 $94.235 593.341 $92.302 $91,102 $89.723 988,145 986,350 984,314 $82.016 $79.432 $76.538 $73,308 969.719 965,746 $61.365 $56,556 $51.299 $45.580 939.388 $32.719 $25.577 $17,975 $9,937 $1.500
($8,840) ($8.840) ($8,840) (98.840) ($8.840) ($8.840) (88.840) ($8.840) ($8,840) ($88.40) ($8.840) (8,840) ($8.840) ($8.840) (S8.840) (88,840) ( $8,840) (8840) ($88.40) ($8.840) ($8.840) ($8,840) ($8,840) ($8,840)
(S8,075) ($7,946) ($7.801) ($7.40) ($7.461) (97,263) ($7.044) ($6.804) ($6.542) ($6,256) ($5.945) ($5,610) ($5,251) ($4.866) ($4.459) ($4,031) ($3.583) ($3.121) ($2.648) (S2.171) ($1.698) ($1.238) (9802) ($402) (954)($765) ($894) ($1.039) ($1.200) ($1,379) ($1.577) (1.796) ($2,035) ($2.298) ($2.584) (92,894) (03,229) (03,589) (93,973) ($4.381) ($4.909) (05,257) ($5,719) (S6,192) ($6.669) (S7.142) (S7.602) ($8,038) (S8.438) ($8.786)
1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 11% 14% 17% 22% 30% 45% 85% 100%
Scenado 2 does $50,000 home-equity loan at year 13ScenarIo 2 1
OLB 95,000
Yeadly Payment (98.840)
Interest (S8,075)
Pdncipsi (S765)
Percent Equity 1%
ReheAbltalon Costs Year 13 9 50.000
HonWEq.iy Loan OL
Yearly Payment (8.5%)
Interest
Pdincipal
Term 15 years
PV of $50K at Year 13 $34,729
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Is 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25$94235 $93.341 $92.302 $91.102 S89.723 $88.145 986.350 S84.314 S82.016 $79,432 $76.538 $73,306 $69.719 $65.746 S61,365 956,556 $51,299 945,580 $39,388 $32,719 $25,577 $17.975 $9,937 $1,500
(18.840) ($88.40) (98.840) ($8.840) ($8.840) ($88.40) ($8.840) ($8.840) (98.840) ($8.840) ($8,840) ($8.840) ($8.640) ($8.840) ($8,840) ($86,840) ($8,840) ($8.840) ($8.840) ($8.840) (68,840) ($8.840) (98,840) (98.840)
($7,946) ($7.801) ($7.640) ($7.461) ($7.263) ($7.044) ($68.04) ($6.542) ($6.256) ($5,945) ($5.610) ($5,251) ($4.866) ($4.459) ($4,031) ($3.683) ($3.121) ($2,648) ($2.171) (91,698) ($1,238) (9802) (5402) (854)
(S894) ($1.039) ($1.200) ($1.379) (11.577) ($1.796) ($2,035) ($2.298) (12,584) ($2,894) (03.229) (93.589) ($3.973) ($4.381) (S4.809) ($5.257) ($5,719) ($6.192) ($6.669) ($7,142) ($7,602) (68.038) ($8.438) (S8.786)
1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 11% 14% 17% 22% 30% 45% 85% 100%
1 2 3 4 6 6 7 860.000 48229 46.162 43,775 41.045 37,952 34,480 30.618
(68,021) ($6.021) ($6.021) ($6.021) ($6,021) (S6,021) (16.021) ($6,021)
($4,250) ($3.954) ($3.634) ($3.291) ($2.928) ($2,549) ($2,160) (61,767)
(S1.771) ($2,067) ($2.387) ($2.730) ($3.093) ($3.472) ($3,861) ($4.254)
9 10 11 12 13
26.365 21.725 16,716 11,370 5.730
($6.021) ($6.021) ($6,021) ($6,021) ($6,021)
($1.381) ($1.013) (9674) (9381) ($150)
(S4,640) (95,008) (S5.347) ($5.640) ($5.871)
($8,840) ($8.840) ($8.840) ($8.840) ($8.840) ($8.840) ($8.840) ($8.840) (98,840) (18.840) ($8.840) ($14.861) ($14.861) ($14.861) ($14,861) ($14,861) ($14.861) ($14,861) ($14.61) ($14.861) ($14.861) ($14,861) ($14,B61) ($14,861)Total Yearly Payments
PV of SI4K ot Year 13
($8.840)
$9,533
Costruction Costs (Selected Items) 47 Aspinwal 55 Aspinwal 17 Kenberms
Rough Carpentry $ 38,950 $ 17.000 $ 10,090
FiihCarpentry $ 28.000 S 35.000 $ 22.000
Finish" 6 21.000 S 32.000 8 30.000
ToM 6 88.000 1 60.000 $ 78.000
Halvina the Work of Selected Items 9 44.000 S 30.000 2 39.000
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
Paula Harrington, Neighborhood of Affordable Housing, February 1997.
Mark Duluk, Kitty Ryan, Bob Wegener, The Narrow Gate Architects, February 1997.
Ken Wade, Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation, February 1997.
Mat Thall and Sandra Martin, Local Initiative Support Corporation, April 1997.
Ann Houston, Codman Square Neighborhood Development Corporation, April 1997.
Sharon Riley, Codman Square Neighborhood Development Corporation, April 1997.
Lizbeth Hire, Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Development Corporation, April 1997.
Mike Stella, Star Contracting, April 1997.
Steve La Rosa, May 1997.
